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Abstract
Accounting fraud is a global concern representing a significant threat to the
financial system stability due to the resulting diminishing of the market confidence
and trust of regulatory authorities. Several tricks can be used to commit
accounting fraud, hence the need for non-static regulatory interventions that take
into account different fraudulent patterns. Accordingly, this study aims to improve
the detection of accounting fraud via the implementation of several machine
learning methods to better differentiate between fraud and non-fraud companies,
and to further assist the task of examination within the riskier firms by evaluating
relevant financial indicators. Out-of-sample results suggest there is a great
potential in detecting falsified financial statements through statistical modelling
and analysis of publicly available accounting information. The proposed
methodology can be of assistance to public auditors and regulatory agencies as it
facilitates auditing processes, and supports more targeted and effective
examinations of accounting reports.
Keywords: Forensic Accounting, Accounting Fraud, Machine Learning, Corporate
Regulation
1. Introduction
In the last few decades, accounting fraud has been drawing a great deal of
attention amongst researchers and practitioners, since it is becoming increasingly
frequent and diverse. Accounting fraud is one of the most harmful financial crimes
as it often results in massive corporate collapses, commonly silenced by powerful
high-status executives and managers (Mokhiber and Weissman, 2005). Given their
hidden dynamic characteristics, ‘book cooking’ accounting practices are
particularly hard to detect, hence the need of more sophisticated tools to assist the
exposure of complex fraudulent schemes and the identification of warning signs of
manipulated financial reports.
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The catastrophic consequences of accounting fraud expose how vulnerable and
unprotected the community is in regards to this matter, since most damage is
inflicted to investors, employees and government. Several accounting scandals
reflect this reality, being the Enron infamous case one of the most controversial.
The giant energy company was engaged in a massive fraudulent scheme that
culminated abruptly towards the end of 2001 with its impressive collapse and
further bankruptcy. Consequently, Enron’s investors and stakeholders lost nearly
$74 billion, and 4,500 employees lost their jobs and pensions without proper notice
(Swartz, 2003). Even though the general opinion describes Enron’s failure as
unpredictable, Schilit and Perler (2010) affirm that the disaster could have been
avoided if a careful examination of the public documents during the preceding
years of the debacle had been performed. The impressive revenue growth from $9.2
billion in 1995 to $100.8 billion in 2000 should have warned the public, especially
when considering that profits did not increase at such spectacular rate. They
conclude that the use of relevant indicators could be beneficial to further alert the
public before a disaster occurs.
In the framework of this study, accounting fraud is defined as the calculated
misrepresentation of the financial statement information that is publicly disclosed
by companies. The intention is to mislead stakeholders regarding the firm’s true
financial position, by overstating its expectations on assets, or understating exposure
to liabilities; hence the artificial inflation of earnings, as well as its return on equity.
Accounting fraud may take the form of either direct manipulation of financial items
or via creative methods of accounting (Schilit and Perler, 2010). Several synonyms
of accounting fraud exist in the literature, including the so-called financial statement
fraud, corporate fraud and management fraud.
Perpetrators of accounting fraud can be motivated by personal benefit (e.g.:
maximisation of compensation packages), or by explicit or implied contractual
obligations, such as debt covenants and the need to meet market projections and
expected economic growth. The most harm is inflicted to the long-run reputation
of the organisation itself, the value destruction of investors and the diminishing of
the public’s trust in the capital market (Ngai et al., 2011). Other victims often
include suppliers, partners, customers, regulatory institutions, enforcement
agencies, taxation authorities, the stock exchange, creditors and financial analysts
(Pai et al., 2011).
Standard auditing procedures are often insufficient to identify fraudulent
accounting reports since most managers recognise the limitations of audits, hence
the need for additional dynamic and comprehensive analytical methods to detect
accounting fraud accurately and in an early stage (Kaminski et al., 2004).
Accordingly, the present study aims to improve the detection rate of accounting
fraud offences through the implementation of several machine learning methods
and assessment of industry-specific risk indicators, in order to assist the design of
an innovative, flexible and responsive corporate regulation tool.
In order to achieve the proposed objective, a thorough forensic data analytic
approach is implemented that includes all pertinent steps of a data-driven
methodology. The study contributes in the improvement of accounting fraud
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detection in several ways, including the collection of a comprehensive sample of
fraud and non-fraud firms concerning all financial industries, an extensive analysis
of financial information and significant differences between genuine and fraudulent
reporting, selection of relevant predictors of accounting fraud, contingent
analytical modelling of the phenomenon to better recognise fraudulent cases, and
identification of financial red-flags as indicators of falsified records.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. A critical review of accounting
fraud detection literature is performed in Section 2 as to summarise commonly
used techniques and results achieved in previous studies. Section 3 presents a
detailed description of the proposed methodology including the studied dataset,
sample selection process, explanatory variables examined, variable selection
process and machine learning models considered. Section 4 illustrates the
empirical results of the proposed algorithms and further discussion of key findings.
Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper and gives directions for future research.
2. Accounting Fraud Detection Literature
Part of the fraudulent financial reporting literature has focused primarily in the
examination of qualitative characteristics related to the board of directors and
principal executives, including information of corporate governance structure
(Beasley, 1996; Hansen et al., 1996; Bell and Carcello, 2000) and insider trading
data (Summers and Sweeney, 1998). Studies using this kind of information show
promising results. However, getting access to such data is very difficult and
sometimes even prohibited for most individuals.
On the other hand, studies using publicly available financial statement
information are less common and usually incorporate small samples. Generally, the
selection of fraud cases is limited to certain conditions and manually matched after
with non-fraud observations on the basis of business fundamentals, such as
industry, size, maturity, period and more. Undoubtedly, there is an interesting gap
in this area of the literature where the selection process of a more representative
sample has the potential to be explored and expanded.
With regard to the employed techniques, discriminant analysis and logistic
regression are by far the most popular. Such algorithms are commonly considered
as a benchmark framework due to their simplicity and low computational cost, and
because they have been proven to efficiently detect falsified accounting reporting in
relatively small samples (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Spathis et al., 2002; Kaminski
et al., 2004; Pai et al., 2011). Better results have been achieved by the
implementation of decision trees, a popular machine learning method often used to
predict fraudulent accounting records mainly due to their fewer data preparation
requirements and intuitive interpretation (Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Kirkos et al.,
2007; Pai et al., 2011; Gupta and Gill, 2012; Song et al., 2014).
Alternative and more advanced approaches have also been adopted in order to
detect accounting fraud. Neural networks are also in high demand for accounting
fraud detection as they have shown promising results when predicting fraudulent
reporting practices (Kwon and Feroz, 1996; Choi and Green, 1997; Fanning and
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Cogger, 1998; Feroz et al., 2000; Ravisankar et al., 2011). A similar situation is
experienced when considering more complex settings, such as support vector
machines (Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Ravisankar et al., 2011; Pai et al., 2011; Song
et al., 2014), Bayesian networks (Kirkos et al., 2007), genetic programming (Hoogs
et al., 2007) and hybrid methods (Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Song et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, the achieved performance of the aforementioned methodologies is
counteracted by the considerable drawbacks that these methods entail, including
important computational costs and overfitting proneness, as well as struggling
when interpreting results (Tu, 1996; Abe, 2005).
A list of prior studies using machine learning techniques for accounting fraud
detection is summarised in Table 1. Additional methodological details are also
provided, such as the size of the chosen samples, number of fraud cases, methods
employed and overall accuracy, when available.
Many contributions can be attributed to prior studies as all accounting fraud
research enhance awareness and knowledge of this phenomenon. Furthermore, it
can be said that forensic accounting strongly supports accounting fraud detection
and promotes the design of relevant anti-fraud preventive measures.
However, a great deal of work can be further done to improve detection strategies
in many ways. First, it can be observed that sample sizes of previous studies are
fairly small and that, in general, samples are manually selected. The latter is a highly
problematic practice as it is inherently biased and so results cannot be extrapolated
to the population. Therefore, increasing the amount of data used to train, validate
and test the models is a noticeable enhancement, as well as attempting to collect as
many fraudulent cases as possible, and not only the most convenient for the sake of
research results.
Moreover, most prior studies focus their analysis in specific industries defined
by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. After careful review, it is
surprisingly observed that there are no studies that investigate accounting fraud
within financial services firms, situation that can be depicted in Table 2. The main
reason for the exclusion of these entities is that they are structurally different and an
alternative set of variables may be required since certain financial statement items,
such as accounts receivable and inventory, are not available for these companies.
Hence “research to find the variables most useful in the specific industries would be
of great value”, especially in the poorly examined area of financial services (Fanning
and Cogger, 1998). As such, a substantial improvement is achieved in the present
study as cases from all industries are included.
Additional improvements in the area of accounting fraud detection can be
attained when considering more relevant machine learning methods and
performance evaluation metrics. As previously mentioned, complex techniques
have been implemented in prior studies, most of them achieving superior
performance compared to more basic methods, but the cost of this improvement is
relatively high when taking into account the considerable drawbacks that these
algorithms entail in terms of computational costs and interpretability. Also, most
studies only focus on maximising overall accuracy without further consideration of
more suitable assessment measurements.
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Table 1: Prior studies in detecting accounting fraud
Study
Sample
Size
Fraud
Cases
Method(s)
Overall
Accuracy (%)
Persons (1995) 206 103 Logistic Regression n/a
Kwon & Feroz (1996) 70 35
Neural Networks
Logistic Regression
88
47
Choi and Green (1997) 172 86 Neural Networks n/a
Fanning & Cogger (1998) 204 102
Logistic Regression
Discriminant Analysis
Neural Networks
50
52
63
Lee et al. (1999) 620 56 Logistic Regression n/a
Feroz et al. (2000) 132 42
Neural Networks
Logistic Regression
81
70
Spathis (2002) 76 38 Logistic Regression 84
Spathis et al. (2002) 76 38
Multicriteria Decision Aid Method
Discriminant Analysis
Logistic Regression
88
84
81
Lin et al. (2003) 200 40
Neural Networks
Logistic Regression
76
79
Kaminski et al. (2004) 158 79 Discriminant Analysis n/a
Kotsiantis et al. (2006) 164 41
Decision Trees
Neural Networks
Bayesian Networks
Logistic Regression
Support Vector Machines
Hybrid Decision Support System
91
80
74
75
79
95
Kirkos et al. (2007) 76 38
Decision Trees
Neural Networks
Bayesian Networks
74
80
90
Hoogs et al. (2007) 390 51 Genetic Programming n/a
Lenard et al. (2007) 30 15 Logistic Regression 77
Ravisankar et al. (2011) 202 101
Support Vector Machines
Genetic Programming
Logistic Regression
Neural Networks
72
89
71
91
Pai et al. (2011) 75 25
Support Vector Machines
Discriminant Analysis
Logistic Regression
Decision Trees
Neural Networks
92
81
79
84
83
Gupta & Singh (2012) 114 29
Decision Trees
Genetic Programming
95
88
Danial et al. (2014) 130 65 Logistic Regression 75
Song et al. (2014) 550 110
Logistic Regression
Decision Trees
Neural Networks
Support Vector Machines
78
79
85
86
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Consequently, machine learning methods based on decision trees and boosting
techniques are implemented in this paper, since their outcome can be very useful
when detecting accounting fraud as straightforward classification rules can be
extracted, and easily interpreted and replicated by auditors and regulatory
agencies. Furthermore, alternative metrics that account for the difference between
misclassification costs associated with fraud and non-fraud cases, are proposed to
properly measure the predictive ability of the suggested models.
Table 2: SIC Industries included in prior studies
Study Industry
Persons (1995) Manufacturing and services
Kwon & Feroz (1996) n/a
Choi & Green (1997) n/a
Fanning & Cogger (1998) Financial companies excluded
Lee et al. (1999) Financial companies excluded
Feroz et al. (2000) Banking companies excluded
Spathis (2002) Manufacturing firms
Spathis et al. (2002) Manufacturing firms
Lin et al. (2003) n/a
Kaminsky (2004) Banking and insurance firms excluded
Kotsiantis et al. (2006) Manufacturing firms
Kirkos et al. (2007) Manufacturing firms
Hoogs et al. (2007) Financial companies excluded
Lenard et al. (2007) Service-based computer and technology firms
Ravisankar et al. (2011) n/a
Pai et al. (2011) n/a
Gupta & Singh (2012) n/a
Danial et al. (2014) Financial and insurance sectors excluded
Song et al. (2014) Financial companies excluded
In brief, it can be said that although the proposed techniques of previous studies
have increased the detection rate of accounting fraud offences, these are very limited
and often not sufficient to uncover complex fraudulent schemes. It is fairly clear,
then, the need for improved methodologies that assist the fraud detection task to
further discover hidden patterns of falsified financial reports in order to expose them
as soon as possible and, therefore, rapidly address recovery strategies and attenuate
potential losses.
3. Methodology
3.1. Forensic Analytics
According to Van Vlasselaer et al. (2015), fraud offences are not crimes that
happen fortuitously but are carefully planned, concealed and committed.
Accounting fraud perpetrators are continuously conceiving new ways to commit
their offences and, in consequence, always transforming their fraudulent behaviour,
thus the complexity of the accounting fraud phenomenon. This deliberate
managerial wrongdoing is particularly hard to detect and predict, since it involves
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deep knowledge of accounting and legal tricks that are intentionally employed to
make documents look genuine and error-free.
Forensic data analysis is concerned with the treatment and examination of
financial crime offences, hence the relevance of its use to develop an adequate
technique for accounting fraud detection. Therefore, a forensic accounting
approach is proposed in order to overcome potential auditing failure and further
improve examination of public documents through the recommendation of
meaningful analysis of accounting items.
3.2. Data
The data collection task is critical in financial crime-related research, since it is
very difficult to find sufficient and accurate data for analysis. In addition, and
given the highly sensitive nature of the topic, there is a limited amount of relevant
journal articles related to accounting fraud detection, and publication of
controversial results may be censored or even prohibited (Bolton and Hand, 2002).
Therefore, a compilation of an exhaustive and representative database containing
relevant cases of accounting fraud instances is imperative to further design an
adequate and integral fraud-detection method.
In this study, accounting fraud cases are identified considering all Accounting
Series Releases (ASR) and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAER) issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between
1990 and 2012. In particular, all public litigation releases involving deceptive
reporting were hand-collected first from the SEC’s website1 and then
cross-validated with an official accounting fraud database provided by the
Securities and Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC), Stanford Law School.
Non-public companies were excluded from this study, since the SEC only has
jurisdiction over publicly traded companies.
The selection of the studied period is justified based on data availability and
practicality considerations. On the one hand, discovered fraud cases published by
the SEC include successful enforcement actions with monetary sanctions exceeding
$1 million announced between July 29, 2002 and present. Accounting fraud cases
released by the SEC date from 1990 onwards, hence the selection of the year 1990
as the beginning of the studied period. On the other hand, this study began in the
middle of 2013, so including this year would have been erroneous considering that
many cases of fraud could have been discovered in the remainder of the year. As
such, 2012 is selected as the end year of the studied period.
The resulting fraud database consists of 1,594 fraud-year observations identified
by company I.D. and fiscal year of the offence. Table 3 summarises the number of
fraudulent observations obtained after splitting fraud cases into the corresponding
years of occurrence, particularly arranged by industry.
1SEC Sanctions Database: https://www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/program/
sec-enforcement/sanctions-database/
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Table 3: Fraud cases by industry
SIC Standard Industrial Fraud Perc
Codes Classification (SIC) Cases (%)
0100 - 0999 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 11 0.69
1000 - 1799 Mining and Construction 52 3.26
2000 - 3999 Manufacturing 609 38.21
4000 - 4999 Transportation, Communications, Electric and Gas 106 6.65
5000 - 5999 Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade 169 10.60
6000 - 6799 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 236 14.81
7000 - 8999 Services 375 23.53
9100 - 9729 Public Administration 36 2.26
1,594 100
3.3. Sample Selection
One of the main characteristics that defines the fraud phenomenon so uniquely
is that it is an uncommon activity (Van Vlasselaer et al., 2015), particularly in the
context of accounting fraud, since only a minority of the recorded cases are
actually classified as fraudulent. Learning from these rare events is a very
challenging task given the small amount of observations available to train
predictive models, hence especially difficult to further discriminate between
fraudulent and non-fraudulent instances. As Cerullo and Cerullo (1999) express in
regards to this matter, “unrepresentative sample data or too few data observations
will result in a model that poorly estimates or predicts future values”.
The class-imbalance problem fully emerges when statistical learning models are
applied, because they all opt for a naive strategy of classifying all firms as
non-fraudulent. As a consequence, accuracy measures show excellent average
performance that only reflect the underlying uneven class distribution.
Nevertheless, the methods are totally ineffective in detecting positive cases
(Chawla et al., 2004). Therefore, the selection of a more proportionate sample in
terms of positive and negative cases is required in order to solve the imbalance
problem encountered in this study, and also to enhance the discriminatory power
of the proposed statistical models.
A stratifying exercise is conducted according to the target variable Fraud, where
a pairing exercise is performed to match each fraud observations with a non-fraud
observation on the basis of industry and fiscal period. Consequently, the sample
selection process occurs in two phases, first dividing the dataset by SIC industry
and fiscal year, and then randomly selecting non-fraud instances from each subgroup.
A variety of sampling methods can be employed when dealing with imbalanced
datasets, individually or in combination, hence an extensive and interesting analysis
could be done to select suitable samples of fraud and non-fraud cases. A more
detailed discussion about this topic is addressed in Section 5.2.
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3.4. Variables
A great deal of research studies includes subjective judgment and/or qualitative
and non-public information into their models, that are only available to auditors
and insiders of the sampled firms. Accounting data, on the other hand, is publicly
available for external interested parties, hence whether it can be used to detect
falsified reporting is an intriguing question (Persons, 1995).
The literature suggests that financial statement information is useful for
accounting fraud detection. In particular, it can be seen that ratio analysis is very
popular for this end suggesting that a careful reading of financial ratios can
reasonably expose symptoms of fraudulent behaviour. As such, ratios are
calculated to quantify the relation between two financial items and to subsequently
define acceptable legitimate values. Therefore, if a fraudulent activity is taking
place, financial ratios associated with manipulated accounts will deviate from the
normal behaviour and conveniently exhibit signs of accounting fraud.
There has been an interesting debate about which features should be used for
detecting falsified reports, but still no agreement on which ones are best for this end.
An in-depth analysis of the most severe accounting scandals occurred in the U.S. in
the last few decades (Schilit and Perler, 2010) shows that the most frequent tricks
managers employ in order to hide debilitated businesses are commonly associated
with the manipulation of earnings and cash flow items.
In this manner, and considering relevant and significant variables resulting from
prior research work on the topic, this study identifies 20 financial statement ratios
that measure the majority of aspects of a firm’s financial performance, including
leverage, profitability, liquidity and efficiency.
Leverage
One of the most important aspects of a firm is leverage, since it represents the
potential return of an investment based on the debt structure of the company. When
debt is used to purchase assets, then the value of assets exceeds the borrowing cost,
basically because debt interest is tax deductible.
However, this practice comes with greater risks for investors, considering that
sometimes firms are not able to pay their debt obligations. In consequence,
companies having trouble paying their debts may be tempted to manipulate
financial statements in order to meet debt covenants. Therefore, high levels of debt
should increase the likelihood of accounting fraud, since it transfers the risk from
the firm and its managers to shareholders.
This aspect is measured by the ratios of TLTA (total liabilities to total assets),
TLTE (total liabilities to total equity) and LTDTA (long-term debt to total assets).
Profitability
Profitability measures are used to estimate the ability of a firm to generate
earnings compared to its costs, hence the importance of maintaining these metrics
in line with market projections. As consequence, executives may be willing to
manipulate earnings-related financial statements in order to cover profitability
problems when companies are not performing as expected.
To test whether firms with poorer financial condition are more likely to engage
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in fraudulent financial reporting, relevant ratios associated with income, expenses
and retained earnings will be considered. These ratios are: NITA (net income to
total assets), RETA (retained earnings to total assets) and EBITTA (earnings before
interest and tax to total assets).
Liquidity
Liquidity refers to the ability to which an asset can be converted from an
investment to cash. This concept is highly important for businesses and investors,
since liquid assets reduce in some extent investing risks by ensuring the capacity of
a firm to pay off debts as they come due. Consequently, problems involving
liquidity may provide an incentive for managers to commit accounting fraud, hence
the need to investigate financial ratios related to the liquid composition of assets,
as is the case of working capital and current assets. This aspect is evaluated then
by the following ratios: WCTA (working capital to total assets), CATA (current
assets to total assets), CACL (current assets to current liabilities) and CHNI (cash
to net income).
Many investors have alternatively focused their attention on the company’s
capability to generate cash from its actual business operations. This aspect
however, is usually manipulated since “companies can exert a great deal of
discretion when presenting cash flows” (Schilit and Perler, 2010). Ergo, the
importance of thoroughly analyse cash flow from operations and, in particular,
evaluate its relationship with reported earnings. Therefore, the CFFONI ratio
(cash flow from operations to net income) is further considered.
Efficiency
Financial efficiency refers to the capacity of producing as much as possible
using as few resources as possible. Inefficiency usually involves higher costs, hence
resulting in poorer firm’s performance, which may motivate managers to misstate
financial statements that allow subjective estimations, and therefore, are easier to
manipulate. Such is the case of accounts receivable, accounts payable, inventory
and cost of good sold, so financial ratios related to these accounts are further
selected. This aspect is evaluated by ratios involving the aforementioned items,
including RVSA (accounts receivable to total sales), RVTA (accounts receivable to
total assets), IVTA (inventory to total assets), IVSA (inventory to total sales),
IVCA (inventory to current assets), IVCOGS (inventory to cost of good sold) and
PYCOGS (accounts payable to cost of good sold).
Efficiency it also linked to capital turnover, which represents the sales generating
power of a firm’s assets. In order to maintain the appearance of consistent growth,
fraudulent managers may be tempted to manipulate sale-related financial items when
dealing with competitive situations. Accordingly, two sale-ratios are considered in
order to identify possible fictitious trend in growth, including SATA (total sales to
total assets) and SATE (total sales to total equity).
A summary of the aforementioned financial ratios is presented in Table 4, along
with the category to which they belong to and their respective calculations.
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Table 4: Summary of considered financial ratios and calculation
Category Financial Ratio Calculation
TLTA Total Liabilities / Total Assets
Leverage TLTE Total Liabilities / Total Equity
LTDTA Long-Term Debt / Total Assets
NITA Net Income / Total Assets
Profitability RETA Retained Earnings / Total Assets
EBITTA Earning Before Interest and Tax / Total Assets
WCTA Working Capital / Total Assets
CATA Current Assets / Total Assets
Liquidity CACL Current Assets / Current Liabilities
CHNI Cash / Net Income
CFFONI Cash Flow From Operations / Net Income
RVSA Accounts Receivable / Total Sales
RVTA Accounts Receivable / Total Assets
IVSA Inventory / Total Sales
Efficiency IVTA Inventory / Total Assets
IVCA Inventory / Current Assets
IVCOGS Inventory / Cost of Good Sold
PYCOGS Accounts Payable / Cost of Good Sold
SATA Total Sales / Total Assets
SATE Total Sales / Total Equity
3.5. Variable Selection
Most analytical models implemented to detect fraudulent financial reporting
start with numerous variables, out of which only a minority actually contribute to
their classification power (Baesens et al., 2015). Thereby, a question of interest to
the public is whether fewer explanatory variables can be used in order to achieve
similar accuracy rates as those accomplished when using more predictors.
A simple yet very informative univariate analysis is performed in this study in
order to evaluate potential differences between financial accounts related to
fraudulent and genuine reports, and to further select significant financial ratios
that may be suggesting that accounting fraud has been or is being committed.
The so-called Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric method that is commonly
employed for this end due to its ease of use and availability in several advanced
statistical software. In simple terms, non-parametric methods refer to statistical
techniques that do not make assumptions on the data distribution, hence the reason
they are also called distribution-free tests (Hollander et al., 2013). These models
are particularly useful when there are clear outliers or extreme observations in the
data, as is the case of the studied database.
What it sought with this non-parametric hypothesis testing technique is to test
if the distribution of fraud data differs significantly compared to non-fraud data.
Therefore, the Mann-Whitney test is performed using the rank of the data, that is,
the position of each observation within the sample rather than the value per se. In
light of this, then it is easy to notice that outliers will have a minimal effect on the
test, which makes it very robust in terms of extreme values (Sheskin, 2003).
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The following hypotheses are specified for the Mann-Whitney test:
H0 : the distribution of both groups are equal
H1 : the distribution of both groups are not equal
(1)
If p-value is lower than the 0.05 significance level considered in this paper, then
the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected, so the evidence favours the alternative, H1.
Therefore, it can be said that there is a significant difference between the non-
fraudulent firms and fraudulent firms with regard to the financial ratio of interest.
It is worth mentioning that when the suggested tests were conducted considering
all observations regardless of the SIC industry they belong to, almost all variables
revealed to be significant, which does not contribute to the analysis substantially.
Moreover, assuming fraudsters behave the same across all sectors is fairly naive, so
a more elaborated domain-specific examination is reasonably required.
Consequently, twenty Mann-Whitney tests are performed per industry, one per
selected financial ratio. Table 5 lists industry-specific significant predictors and
the relationship with the dependent variable Fraud. Interesting differences between
sectors emerge from the performed analysis as some ratios are significant or not
depending on the industry the observations belongs to.
On one hand, inventory and retained earnings are relevant predictors in the
industries of transportation, communication, electric gas and sanitary service,
wholesale trade and retail trade, and services. This may be due to the fact that
inventory volumes and retained earnings are easily falsified within the
aforementioned sectors. On the other hand, manufacturing companies may be
tempted to modify items related to liabilities as well as current assets, while
finance, insurance and real estate firms manipulate liabilities and cash flow from
operation figures.
3.6. Correlation Analysis
A very popular technique, often applied in data analytics, is correlation analysis.
This method is used to evaluate possible relationships between numerical variables,
which is particularly useful when working with accounting items that inevitably
interact with each other due to the composition of a financial statement report.
The correlation coefficient quantifies the direction and strength of the implicit
relationship of two variables of interest, and only expresses the association between
them, not the causality. Nonetheless, if correlation is found between two variables,
then it can be used as an indicator of a potential casual relation.
Kendall correlation coefficients will be used to assess monotonic relationships,
that could be linear or not, based-on rank similarity (Kendall, 1955). Monotonic
relationships occur when one variable increases as well as the other variable, or
when one variable increases and the other one decreases. The increase/decrease of
the analysed variables could happen at the same rate, which is the case of linear
relations, or in a dissimilar proportion, which is the case of non-linear associations.
The Kendall correlation is a non-parametric correlation metric, that is, it
makes no assumptions on the distribution of the data. It is said to be a measure of
rank correlation in the sense that it calculates the relative position of all
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observations within one variable (rank position), and then compares them with the
ranks obtained within the second variable. If observations from both variables
have a similar rank (concordant observations), then a high positive correlation will
be obtained. Conversely, if ranks are dissimilar (discordant observations), then
negative correlations are expected.
Kendall coefficients always range between +1 and −1, and they can be calculated
using the Tau-A statistic defined as follows:
τA =
nc − nd
n(n− 1)/2 (2)
where nc is the number of concordant pair of observations, nd is the number of
discordant pair of observations, and n is the sample size.
The resulting Kendall correlation matrix is presented below (Figure 1),
summarising the correlation coefficients between all financial ratios. A friendly
coloured legend is utilised to facilitate visualisation, where intense red boxes
indicate positive relationships and intense blue boxes indicate negative
associations.
Figure 1: Kendall Correlation Matrix
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Table 5: Significant financial ratios by industry
Ratio*
Agriculture, Mining and
Manufacturing
Transportation, Wholesale Trade Finance,
Services
Public
Forestry Construction Communications, Electric, and Retail Trade Insurance and Administration
and Fishing Gas and Sanitary Service Real Estate
TLTA + - +
TLTE + + +
LTDTA + + +
NITA -
RETA + - + + + + +
EBITTA + + + + +
WCTA
CATA - + -
CACL - - - - -
CHNI -
CFFONI -
RVSA - - - -
RVTA +
IVSA - - +
IVTA + - + - +
IVCA + + - + - +
IVCOGS + + - +
PYCOGS - - - - -
SATA + - - - -
SATE +
Notes:
+ represents a positive association with the target variable, Fraud
- represents a negative association with the target variable, Fraud
* Two-tailed test at the 0.05 significance level
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In addition, a summary of most relevant correlations is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Most relevant Kendall correlation coefficients
Financial Ratios Correlation Coefficient
IVSA IVCOGS 0.8693
IVTA IVCA 0.8167
WCTA CACL 0.7732
IVSA IVTA 0.7485
NITA RETA 0.7275
NITA EBITTA 0.7275
TLTA TLTE 0.7145
IVSA IVCA 0.7039
IVCA IVCOGS 0.6523
WCTA CATA 0.5684
SATA SATE 0.5504
It can be clearly seen that all inventory-related ratios are strongly positive
correlated: IVSA, IVTA, IVCA and IVCOGS. Although this situation is
completely expected, it entails an important issue when implementing regression
models. If two or more variables are highly correlated then multicollinearity
emerges, which means some predictors are redundant. As such, the estimated
coefficients of the regression model may be inaccurate, and therefore, not very
reliable.
Furthermore, a strong positive association has also been found between CACL
and WCTA. This is not surprising considering that WC is actually the subtraction
of CA and CL, hence a direct relation between these three financial items results
from mathematical construction. In addition, and as expected, strong positive
correlations between ratios related to profitability have been exposed, which
includes both NITA and RETA, as well as NITA and EBITTA. A moderate
positive relation between TLTA and TLTE can also be observed, which is
completely expected since total assets are calculated as the sum of total liabilities
and total equity. Finally, moderate positive correlations have been also exposed
between the ratios WCTA and CATA, as well as between SATA and SATE. This
latter association makes perfect sense as both ratios are related to sales figures.
Results obtained from the detailed financial ratio analysis performed, which
includes non-parametric hypothesis testing and correlation analysis, support the
selection of a smaller and meaningful subset of industry-specific explanatory
variables. As such, Table 7 provided below lists selected financial ratios by SIC
industry that will be further utilised for modelling purposes.
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Table 7: Summary of selected financial ratios by industry domain
Industry No. of Ratios Selected Ratios
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 4 RETA, CATA
IVSA, PYCOGS
TLTA, TLTE
LTDTA, RETA
Mining and Construction 10 CACL, RVSA
IVTA, IVCOGS
PYCOGS, SATA
TLTA, TLTE
Manufacturing 6 RETA, CATA
CACL, RVSA
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 5 RETA, IVSA
Gas and Sanitary Service IVTA, SATA
PYCOGS
RETA
Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade 3 CATA
IVSA
TLTA, TLTE
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 8 LTDTA, RETA
CFFONI, IVCOGS
PYCOGS, SATA
RETA, CACL
Services 6 IVSA, IVCOGS
PYCOGS, SATA
LTDTA, RETA
Public Administration 8 CATA, CACL
IVSA, IVTA
IVCOGS, SATA
3.7. Machine Learning Methods
The binary outcome model is considered to be the foundational scheme for
detecting accounting fraud since the aim is to classify future observations into only
two possible values: fraud or non-fraud.
Accordingly, this study assesses the effectiveness of several machine learning
models in the identification of fraudulent reporting. First, discriminant analysis
and logistic regression are employed as benchmark framework, followed by the
implementation of more advanced but easy-to-interpret algorithms, including
AdaBoost, decision trees, boosted trees and random forests.
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The motivation for using boosting techniques and tree-based methods is
supported in part by the poor detection accuracy of basic models and in part by
the excessive complexity of more sophisticated approaches, such as neural networks
and support vector machines.
In order to achieve a consistent notation throughout the Section, the following
conventions are used for mathematical equations:
• A superscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix or vector.
• Y = 1: fraudulent observation.
• Y = 0: non-fraudulent observation.
• P (Y = 1 | X): posterior probability of fraud.
• P (Y = 0 | X): posterior probability of non-fraud.
It is worth noting that given there are only two possible outcomes, then it holds
that:
P (Y = 0 | X) = 1− P (Y = 1 | X) (3)
The models were employed as implemented in the Scikit-Learn library (Pedregosa
et al., 2011) and an exhaustive explanation of each algorithm is given in what follows.
3.7.1. Discriminant Analysis (DA)
Discriminant analysis is a supervised method used in statistics to address
classification problems and to make predictions of a categorical dependent variable.
The main idea is to classify an observation into one of the predefined classes using
a combination of one or more continuous independent variables in order to
generate a discriminant function which best differentiate between the groups.
Subsequently, a decision boundary is generated by fitting class conditional
densities P (X | Y ) to the data using Bayes’ rule:
P (Y | X) = P (X | Y )P (Y )
P (X)
=
P (X | Y )P (Y )∑
y P (X | Y = y)P (Y = y)
(4)
The appropriate class is selected which maximises these conditional probabilities.
In the case of accounting fraud, only two classes are of interest; therefore:
P (Y = 0 | X) = P (X | Y = 0)P (Y = 0)
P (X | Y = 0)P (Y = 0) + P (X | Y = 1)P (Y = 1) (5)
P (Y = 1 | X) = P (X | Y = 1)P (Y = 1)
P (X | Y = 0)P (Y = 0) + P (X | Y = 1)P (Y = 1) (6)
The optimisation task is ultimately achieved using the training data to estimate
class priors, both P (Y = 0) and P (Y = 1), class means and the covariance matrices.
In particular, class priors are estimated as the proportion of instances in each class,
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that is, number of fraudulent (or non-fraudulent) observation divided by the total
number of observations. Class means are estimated using the empirical sample class
means. Similarly, covariance matrices are estimated using the empirical sample class
covariance matrices.
In accordance with the aforementioned, the following assumptions are made:
1. Predictors are all statistically independent.
2. P (X | Y ) follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution, with a class-specific
mean and covariance matrix.
Different assumptions associated with the covariance matrix will lead to
different decision boundaries, one defined by a linear combination of the predictors
and another one by a quadratic form.
In both cases, however, the predicted class will be determined using a
classification threshold of 0.5. As such, if the estimated probability of fraud
occurrence (P (Y = 1)) is equal or higher than 0.5, then the observation will be
classified as fraudulent. On the contrary, if P (Y = 1) is lower than 0.5, or
equivalently P (Y = 0) ≥ 0.5, then the observation will be classified as
non-fraudulent.
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)
In the particular case of linear discriminant analysis, a multivariate normal
distribution of the predictors is presumed with a distinct mean for each class and a
covariance matrix that is common to all classes. For accounting fraud detection,
this means that both fraud and non-fraud classes share the same covariance matrix
Σ0 = Σ1 = Σ.
The advantage of a common covariance matrix is that it simplifies the problem
by reducing the computational cost of estimating a large number of parameters when
the number of predictors is relatively large. Taking this into consideration, then it
is true that:
P (X | Y = 0) = 1
(2pi)n |Σ|1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(X − µ0)TΣ−1(X − µ0)
)
(7)
P (X | Y = 1) = 1
(2pi)n |Σ|1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(X − µ1)TΣ−1(X − µ1)
)
(8)
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA)
Furthermore, quadratic discriminant analysis provides a similar approach yet
now it is assumed that the covariance matrix is class-specific, i.e.: X ∼ N(µk,Σk)
for the kth class. Therefore:
P (X | Y = 0) = 1
(2pi)n |Σ0|1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(X − µ0)TΣ−10 (X − µ0)
)
(9)
P (X | Y = 1) = 1
(2pi)n |Σ1|1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(X − µ1)TΣ−11 (X − µ1)
)
(10)
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3.7.2. Logistic Regression (LR)
Similar to discriminant analysis, logistic regression is commonly use for
performing binary classification. This time the goal is to fit a regression model
that estimate the accounting fraud likelihood applying a logistic function that is
linear in its argument:
σ(Z) =
1
1 + exp(−Z) (11)
In order to obtain the best classification possible, the posterior probability of
belonging to one of both categories is calculated by maximising the likelihood
function. Likewise, let P (Y = 1 | X) be the posterior probability of fraud (Bishop,
2006), then:
P (Y = 1 | X) = y(X) = σ(wTX) (12)
For a dataset {xn, tn}, where tn ∈ {0,1} and n = 1, ..., N , the likelihood of any
specific outcome is given by:
P (t | w) =
∑
n
ytnn {1− yn}1−tn (13)
where t = (t1, ..., tN)
T and yn = P (Y = 1 | xn).
As mentioned before, the maximum likelihood estimates of w are obtain by
minimising the cross-entropy error function defined by the negative logarithm of the
likelihood and then taking its gradient with respect to w:
E(w) = −ln{P (t | w)} = −
∑
n
{tnln(yn) + (1− tn)ln(1− yn)} (14)
5 E(w) =
∑
n
(yn − tn)xn (15)
To finally decide if an observation is classified as fraudulent or non-fraudulent,
then a threshold of 0.5 will be considered. Consequently, if P (Y = 1 | X) is
estimated to be equal or greater than 0.5, then the observation will be classified as
fraudulent. Otherwise, it will be classified as non-fraudulent.
3.7.3. AdaBoost (AB)
Adaptive boosting, widely known as AdaBoost, is a machine learning technique
used for classification and regression problems that combines multiple ’weak learner’
classifiers in order to produce a better boosted classifier. In this context, a weak
learner is a function that is only weakly correlated with the response.
The basic idea is to weight observations wn by how easy or difficult they are to
categorise, giving more importance to those that are harder to predict in order to
learn from them and further construct better subsequent classifiers. Accordingly,
each individual classifier generates an output Gm(X), m = 1, ...,M , for every
observation n of the training set. Then, these classifiers are trained on a weighted
form using αm as classifier coefficients. As mentioned before, misclassified
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instances will be given greater weight when used to train the subsequent classifier
(Bishop, 2006).
The goal is to minimise a weighted error function errm in every iteration m taking
into account the information and performance of previous classifiers. Ultimately and
after the last iteration M , a final boost classifier G(X) is constructed as an additive
combination of all trained weak learner classifiers Gm(X):
G(X) = sign[
∑
m
αmGm(X)] (16)
In this case, a classification threshold of 0.5 has been adopted. As such, an
observation will be classified as fraudulent when G(X) is equal or greater than 0.5,
and classified as non-fraudulent when G(X) is lower than 0.5.
The AdaBoost pseudo code2 is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 AdaBoost
1: Initialise the observation weights wn = 1/N , n = 1, ..., N .
2: for m = 1 to M do
3: Fit a classifier Gm(X) to the training data using weights wn.
4: Compute the weighted error rate.
errm =
∑
nwnI(yn 6= G−m(xn))∑
nwn
5: Compute αm = log((1− errm)/errm).
6: Update the weights,
wn ← wnexp[αmI(yn 6= Gm(xn)]
7: end for
8: Output the classification G(X) = sign[
∑
m αmGm(X)].
3.7.4. Decision Trees (DT)
Decision trees are a non-parametric supervised learning method that classify
observations based on the values of one or more predictors. The advantage of
decision trees lies in the straightforward extraction of if-then classification rules
easily replicable by auditors and regulatory authorities. Also, no assumptions on
the structure of the data is needed, which is very convenient in this case
considering the asymmetrical distribution of some explanatory variables.
The structure of a DT consists of nodes representing a test on a particular
attribute and branches representing an outcome of the test. The idea is to divide
observations into mutually exclusive classes in order to build the smallest set of
2Scharth, M. (2017). Statistical Learning and Data Mining, Module 15 [PowerPoint
presentation]. Discipline of Business Analytics, The University of Sydney Business School,
QBUS6810.
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rules that is consistent with the training data. To identify the attribute that best
separates the sample, information gain and entropy reduction are used as estimation
criteria.
There are several tree algorithms, such as ID3, C4.5, C5.0 and CART, among
others. The chosen method used in this study is the Classification and Regression
Trees (CART) characterised by the construction of binary trees based-on feature
and threshold selection that provide the largest information gain in each node. This
algorithm recursively partitions the space in order to minimise the error or impurity
of each node, resulting in terminal nodes that represent homogeneous groups that
differ substantially from the others.
Accordingly, let the information at node m be Q, then the binary partition of
the data is defined by a candidate split θ that divides the space into two subsets:
Qleft(θ) and Qright(θ).
The error at node m is calculated using an impurity function H evaluated in
both partitions, that later is minimised in order to estimate the parameters.
G(Q, θ) =
nleft
Nm
H(Qleft(θ)) +
nright
Nm
H(Qright(θ)) (17)
θ∗ = argminθG(Q, θ) (18)
The impurity function implemented in this study corresponds to the Gini
function:
H(Xm) =
∑
k
pmk(1− pmk) (19)
where pmk is the proportion of class k observations in node m.
It is worth noting that the partitions of the predictor space are based on a
greedy algorithm called recursive binary splitting. The technique is greedy because
at the best split is made at each step of the tree-building process without taking
into account the consequences further down the tree. Consequently, in some cases
very complex trees are generated as result of this approach. However, a couple of
mechanisms can be used in order to avoid this situation, such as setting the minimum
number of required observations at a leaf node or setting the maximum depth of the
tree.
The tree size is therefore a tuning parameter determining the complexity of the
model and it should be selected adaptively from the data. As such, the maximum
number of node splits in the current study is settled as 5, optimal valued obtained
by cross validation.
Decision trees are remarkably superior than the first two methods used as
benchmark - logistic regression and discriminant analysis - considering how easy
they are to explain, implement and visualise. Unfortunately, they show some
drawbacks that should be mentioned, such as their inherent instability that
emerges when little changes in the data cause a large change in the structure of the
estimated tree, as well as the lower predictive accuracy when compared to more
advanced techniques.
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Decision trees can be used as the basic component of powerful prediction
methods. Therefore, two additional models that employ decision trees as their
foundation, will be introduce in what follows.
3.7.5. Boosted Trees (BT)
Similar to AdaBoost, the boosted trees method is an ensemble of weak learners
but now in the explicit form of fixed size decision trees as base classifiers.
Accordingly, an iterative process takes place in order to fit a decision tree output
hm(X) in every iteration m to improve the previous model Fm(X) by constructing
a new model that adds this new information:
Fm+1(X) = Fm(X) + hm(X) (20)
The main idea is to minimise an error function defined by the difference between
the old model Fm(X) and the new one Fm+1(X), what is called the residual, through
a gradient boosting algorithm that is much like the gradient descent method used
in the logistic regression approach.
In this case, a classification threshold of 0.5 has also been adopted. In this regard,
an observation will be classified as fraudulent when Fm(X) is equal or greater than
0.5, and classified as non-fraudulent when Fm(X) is lower than 0.5.
Same as in the decision tree methodology and for consistency, the maximum
depth of the fitted trees is established to be 5.
3.7.6. Random Forests (RF)
A further enhancement of boosted trees is provided by the random forests
approach, one of the most popular bagging techniques. Bootstrap aggregation, or
bagging, averages many noisy but approximately unbiased models, which results in
a reduction of the variance.
The idea is to fit a classification model to the training data D to obtain the
prediction fˆ(X). Bagging averages this prediction over a collection of bootstrap
samples3. For each bootstrap sample D∗b , b = 1, ..., B, the selected classification
model is fitted to obtain a prediction fˆ ∗b (X). The bagged classifier selects the class
(fraud or non-fraud) with the most “votes” from the B classifiers:
yˆbag(X) = arg max
c
∑
b
I(yˆ∗b (X) = c) (21)
Decision trees are ideal candidates for bagging as they capture complex
interactions structures in the data, which leads to relatively low biased but high
variance. Consequently, classification trees are adopted next for bagging to further
construct random forests.
Random forests improve over bagging by adding an adjustment that helps
decorrelate the trees. In this context, instead of using all predictors, random
forests only select a random subset of the features as split candidates in each step.
3In statistics, bootstrapping is any test or metric that relies on random sampling with
replacement.
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The rationale behind this methodology is that when establishing a fewer and fixed
number of predictors, then more variation in the structure of the model is allowed,
which diminishes the correlation between the resulting trees. Interestingly, this
new condition makes the average of the fitted trees less variable and therefore
more reliable (James et al., 2013).
In building a random forest, k independent variables out of all possible
predictors are randomly selected at each node, and later the best split on the
considered variables is found. As a last step, all trees are averaged to obtain a final
prediction.
The random forests pseudo code4 is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Random Forests
1: for b = 1 to B do
2: Sample N observations with replacement from the training data D to obtain
the bootstrap sample D∗b .
3: Grow a random forest tree Tb to D∗b by repeating the following steps for each
terminal node of the tree, until the minimum node size is reached:
4: (i) Select k variables at random from the K variables.
5: (ii) Pick the best variable and split point among the k candidates.
6: (iii) Split the node into two daughter nodes.
7: end for
8: Output the ensemble of trees {Tb}B1 .
In order to be consistent with the previous methodologies, the maximum depth
of the estimated trees is established to be 5.
3.8. Models Assessment
An interesting issue related to fraudulent reporting is the difference of
misclassification costs. As mentioned previously, most studies only seek to
maximise overall accuracy without further analysing more suitable assessment
measurements.
The cost of misclassification differs when dealing with accounting fraud, since
a false negative error, which is when a fraud observation is classified as non-fraud,
is usually considered more expensive that a false positive error, which is when a
non-fraud observation is classified as fraud. The reasoning behind this is that a
misclassification of a non-fraud firm may cause an important misuse of resources
and time, but a misclassification of a fraudulent company may result in incorrect
decisions and economic damage.
Accordingly, the overall accuracy rate is no longer sufficient to assess model
performance. Other metrics, such as specificity, sensitivity and precision, are now
taken into consideration, as well as G-measure, F-measure and AUC, that are
4Scharth, M. (2017). Statistical Learning and Data Mining, Module 13 [PowerPoint
presentation]. Discipline of Business Analytics, The University of Sydney Business School,
QBUS6810.
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calculated using combinations of these metrics. All mentioned indicators are based
on the confusion matrix shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Confusion matrix
Predicted Positives Predicted Negatives
Real Positives TP FN
Real Negatives FP TN
Model assessment metrics are described next, including the formula used to
calculate them when appropriate.
1. Overall Accuracy: it measures the ability to differentiate both fraudulent
and genuine observations correctly. It is calculated as the proportion of true
positive and true negative cases compared to the total number of observations.
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
(22)
2. Specificity: it evaluates the ability to determine non-fraudulent cases
correctly. As such, it is computed as the proportion of true negative
compared to all legitimate negative observations.
specificity =
TN
TN + FP
(23)
3. Sensitivity: it assesses the capacity to classify fraudulent cases correctly. It
is then calculated as the proportion of true positive cases compared to all
legitimate positive observations.
sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
(24)
4. Precision: it measures the proportion of true positive cases compared to all
predicted positive observations.
precision =
TP
TP + FP
(25)
5. G-Mean: is the geometric mean of sensitivity and specificity measures. As
such, it takes into account the ability of correctly classifying both fraudulent
and non-fraudulent observations.
G−Mean =
√
sensitivity ∗ specificity (26)
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6. F-Measure: is a metric that integrates both measures of precision and
sensitivity
F −Measure = 2 ∗ precision ∗ sensitivity
precision + sensitivity
(27)
7. AUC: The Area Under the Curve (AUC) is a point estimate of the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which evaluates the diagnostic ability
of a binary classifier model as a function of varying a decision threshold. As
such, it assesses both true positive and false positive rates considering
different threshold settings. The AUC is the probability that the binary
classifier will rank a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a
randomly chosen negative one. As such, AUC is always a positive number
range between 0 and 1, so the closer to the unit, the better is the model as it
means it is correctly separating instances into the non-fraud and fraud
groups. The AUC is computed using the trapezoidal rule, which is a
commonly used technique for approximating a definite integral.
Regulatory authorities face critical limitations in terms of human resources,
budget support and time constrains, thus a detailed investigation of all records and
companies is infeasible or too expensive to undertake. Investigations should
concentrate on those firms that are more likely to perpetrate accounting fraud.
Therefore, it is preferable to focus on models that correctly classify fraudulent
observations rather than non-fraudulent cases.
For this reason, G-Mean, F-Measure and AUC will be used as model assessment
criteria, since they properly capture both false positive and false negative errors,
and mitigate the misclassification issue inherent when detecting accounting fraud
offences.
It is worth mentioning, before further presentation and discussion of results, that
all classification accuracy metrics are calculated using out-of-sample data, that is,
considering all the data points not belonging to the training sample. Furthermore,
the considered model will learn the parameters of a prediction function from a subset
of the available data and further tested in a different scenario in order to generalise
the results. A standard practice in statistics is to hold out part of the dataset,
commonly called testing set, and use it later to assess the performance of the model.
Therefore, a stratified 10-fold cross-validation approach is implemented before
running the proposed variable selection technique. As such, the studied dataset is
divided in 10 folds, each one containing an equal number of fraud and non-fraud
cases. For each fold, the model is trained by using the remaining nine folds and
then validated by using the hold out fold. At last, model performance is calculated
as the average performance of all testing folds (Kirkos et al., 2007).
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4. Results and Discussions
Table 9 reports the results of the proposed models by SIC industry.
Table 9: Prediction accuracy by industry
Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (n = 22, p = 4)
LDA 0.714 0.500 1.000 0.600 0.707 0.750 0.750
QDA 0.857 0.750 1.000 0.750 0.866 0.857 0.875
LR 0.714 0.500 1.000 0.600 0.707 0.750 0.750
AB 0.857 0.750 1.000 0.750 0.866 0.857 0.875
DT 0.571 0.750 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.542
BT 0.571 0.750 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.542
RF 0.714 0.500 1.000 0.600 0.707 0.750 0.750
Mining and Construction (n = 104, p = 10)
LDA 0.656 0.917 0.500 0.909 0.677 0.645 0.708
QDA 0.812 0.917 0.750 0.938 0.829 0.833 0.833
LR 0.688 0.917 0.550 0.917 0.710 0.687 0.733
AB 0.625 0.667 0.600 0.750 0.632 0.667 0.633
DT 0.812 0.833 0.800 0.889 0.816 0.842 0.817
BT 0.750 0.833 0.700 0.875 0.764 0.778 0.767
RF 0.781 1.000 0.650 1.000 0.806 0.788 0.825
Manufacturing (n = 1,218, p = 6)
LDA 0.530 0.460 0.594 0.548 0.522 0.570 0.527
QDA 0.546 0.109 0.943 0.539 0.321 0.686 0.526
LR 0.530 0.425 0.625 0.545 0.516 0.583 0.525
AB 0.585 0.557 0.609 0.603 0.583 0.606 0.583
DT 0.555 0.259 0.823 0.551 0.461 0.660 0.541
BT 0.574 0.621 0.531 0.607 0.574 0.567 0.576
RF 0.503 0.460 0.542 0.525 0.499 0.533 0.501
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service
(n = 212, p = 5)
LDA 0.562 0.625 0.500 0.571 0.559 0.533 0.562
QDA 0.562 0.969 0.156 0.833 0.389 0.263 0.562
LR 0.578 0.594 0.562 0.581 0.578 0.571 0.578
AB 0.609 0.719 0.500 0.640 0.599 0.561 0.609
DT 0.531 0.625 0.438 0.538 0.523 0.483 0.531
BT 0.672 0.719 0.625 0.690 0.670 0.656 0.672
RF 0.656 0.562 0.750 0.632 0.650 0.686 0.656
Wholesale and Retail Trade (n = 338, p = 3)
LDA 0.559 0.521 0.593 0.582 0.556 0.587 0.557
QDA 0.500 0.042 0.907 0.516 0.194 0.658 0.475
LR 0.549 0.521 0.574 0.574 0.547 0.574 0.547
AB 0.608 0.542 0.667 0.621 0.601 0.643 0.604
DT 0.637 0.479 0.778 0.627 0.610 0.694 0.628
BT 0.745 0.771 0.722 0.780 0.746 0.750 0.747
RF 0.637 0.625 0.648 0.660 0.636 0.654 0.637
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Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity Precision G-Mean F-Measure AUC
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (n = 472, p = 8)
LDA 0.570 0.621 0.526 0.615 0.572 0.567 0.574
QDA 0.592 0.273 0.868 0.579 0.487 0.695 0.571
LR 0.570 0.591 0.553 0.609 0.571 0.579 0.572
AB 0.648 0.621 0.671 0.671 0.646 0.671 0.646
DT 0.627 0.561 0.684 0.642 0.619 0.662 0.622
BT 0.655 0.682 0.632 0.696 0.656 0.662 0.657
RF 0.627 0.652 0.605 0.667 0.628 0.634 0.628
Services (n = 750, p = 6)
LDA 0.587 0.468 0.698 0.583 0.572 0.635 0.583
QDA 0.587 0.229 0.922 0.560 0.460 0.697 0.576
LR 0.587 0.495 0.672 0.586 0.577 0.627 0.584
AB 0.627 0.550 0.698 0.623 0.620 0.659 0.624
DT 0.631 0.615 0.647 0.641 0.630 0.644 0.631
BT 0.631 0.550 0.707 0.626 0.624 0.664 0.629
RF 0.618 0.477 0.750 0.604 0.598 0.669 0.614
Public Administration (n = 72, p = 8)
LDA 0.636 0.400 0.833 0.625 0.577 0.714 0.617
QDA 0.818 0.900 0.750 0.900 0.822 0.818 0.825
LR 0.727 0.600 0.833 0.714 0.707 0.769 0.717
AB 0.727 0.700 0.750 0.750 0.725 0.750 0.725
DT 0.773 0.700 0.833 0.769 0.764 0.800 0.767
BT 0.773 0.700 0.833 0.769 0.764 0.800 0.767
RF 0.864 0.900 0.833 0.909 0.866 0.870 0.867
It can be seen that results are dissimilar across different industries and machine
learning techniques. Best performance of the proposed models is obtained for firms
belonging to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing industry, Mining and
Construction, and Public Administration. Moderate predictive accuracy is
achieved in the industries of Wholesale and Retail Trade, Transportation and
Communications, and Financials. Inferior accuracy can be observed for
Manufacturing and Services industries.
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
In particular, good classification performance is achieved in the industry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing probably due to the relatively small size of the
sample at issue. Four financial ratios have been considered for modelling purposes,
including RETA, CATA, IVSA and PYCOGS. The results indicate that quadratic
discriminant analysis and boosted trees are the most accurate models as both
achieved an AUC of 0.875. In both cases, 75% of non-fraud cases are correctly
identified, as well as 100% of fraud cases.
Again, special case must be taken when generalising these results, as a fairly
small sample is being considered. It is worth mentioning that no relevant patterns
have been found within this industry when constructing a decision tree. Because of
the small amount of available data, it was unfeasible to find significant red-flags in
this domain.
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Mining and Construction
Good results can also be observed in the case of the Mining and Construction
industry, where ten financial ratios were considered as predictors and a relatively
big sample has been considered. In this case, superior performance has been
achieved by QDA and random forests, mainly because of their remarkable accuracy
when predicting negative cases, that is, high values of specificity. Nevertheless,
good specificity and sensitivity rates are attained when using decision trees as they
correctly classify 83.3% of non-fraud cases and 80% of fraud cases.
More interesting results can be seen when using all observation to construct a
decision tree model. As depicted in Figure 2, two main red-flags, associated with
the items of inventory and accounts receivable, can be used to detect fraudulent
companies in the Mining and Construction industry. The first one is IVTA, as
the evidence suggests that it is more likely to be in presence of fraud when this
ratio is bigger than 0.0118, which indicates that fraudulent firms tend to exaggerate
inventory levels in this particular industry. Hence, fraud alarms should be activated
when inventories represent more than 1.2% of total assets in mining and construction
firms.
The second indicator than can be used to expose falsified reports is RVSA. As
such, when inventory levels compared to assets (IVTA) are within the non-fraudulent
range (i.e.: lower than 0.0118), then auditors should check if RVSA levels are higher
than 0.234. Therefore, the greater the probability of accounting fraud when figures
of receivables represent more than 23.4% of total sales.
Figure 2: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Mining and Construction
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        52      50.0
     Fraud                52      50.0
    Total                 104     100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       38      73.1
     Fraud               14      26.9
    Total                  52     50.0* 
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       14       26.9
     Fraud               38       73.1
    Total                  52       50.0* 
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       30      90.9
     Fraud                 3        9.1
    Total                  33      31.7* 
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        8        42.1
     Fraud               11       57.9
    Total                 19       18.3* 
IVTA
RVSA
<=0.0118 >0.0118
<=0.234 >0.234
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Manufacturing
Inferior performance of all predictive models is achieved when dealing with
manufacturing firms. Relatively better results are obtained by boosting techniques.
In particular, AdaBoost correctly classifies 55.7% of non-fraud cases and 60.9% of
fraud cases, which is only a small improve as opposed to random guessing. This is
at least surprising as the size of the sample considered is relatively big and
predictors have shown significance differences between the groups.
The reason for a poor predictive performance can be associated with the
complexity of the fraud schemes perpetrated within this industry. Although
models show bad performance in general, interesting patterns emerge when
implementing a decision tree method using all observations, as it can be seen in
Figure 3. Falsifying reports in this case, usually involve the manipulation of three
financial items, that is, retained earnings, current assets and total liabilities.
Moreover, decision tree results indicate that auditors should be more sceptical if
RETA is higher that -0.292, CATA lower than 0.347 and TLTE higher than 1.132,
since these three red-flags together are often seen when fraud is being committed in
manufacturing firms. In other words, high probability of accounting fraud will be
present when (i) accounts receivables represent more than 29.2% of total assets; (ii)
the proportion of current assets in relation to total assets is lower than 0.347; and
(iii) total liabilities are 13.2% or higher than shareholders’ equity.
Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service
Moderate accuracy performance is achieved by the proposed methods in this
case, being boosted trees and random forests the ones showing the best results.
On the one hand, random forests perform well when predicting fraud cases (75%),
as opposed to boosted trees that perform better when predicting non-fraud cases
(71.9%).
More relevant results can be observed from Figure 4. The most significant
predictors of accounting fraud committed in this industry are IVSA and PYCOGS.
As such, fraudulent reporting is more likely to be occurring as a result of
misstatement of inventory levels and/or accounts payable figures.
As for the case of inventory manipulation, the warning sign is triggered when
IVSA is lower or equal than zero. From basic accounting, it is known that figures of
inventory and total sales cannot be negative due to the lack of economic meaning.
Then, the only possibility in this case is that inventories are zero. Consequently,
auditors should be cautious when null inventories are part of financial statements
as it may be a sign of accounting fraud.
On the other hand, if inventory levels are not null, then fraud alarm should be
activated when accounts payable represent 28.2% of cost of good sold, as it may be
indicating fraudulent activities of firms belonging to the industry at issue.
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Figure 3: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Manufacturing
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      609      50.0
     Fraud              609      50.0
    Total              1,218    100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       218     59.7
     Fraud               147     40.3
    Total                  365     30.0* 
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       391     45.8
     Fraud               462     54.2
    Total                  853     70.0* 
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        80      41.7
     Fraud               112     58.3
    Total                  192     15.8* 
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      311      47.1
     Fraud              350      52.9
    Total                 661      54.2* 
RETA
CATA
<=-0.292 >-0.292
<=0.347 >0.347
Node 5
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       27      47.4
     Fraud               30      52.6
    Total                  57       4.7* 
Node 6
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       53       39.3
     Fraud               82       60.7
    Total                135       11.1* 
TLTE
<=1.132 >1.132
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Figure 4: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Transp., Comm., Electric, Gas and Sanitary Serv.
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      106     50.0
     Fraud              106     50.0
    Total                 212    100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       24      38.1
     Fraud               39      61.9
    Total                  63      29.7* 
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       82       55.0
     Fraud               67       45.0
    Total                 149      70.3* 
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       75       60.0
     Fraud               50       40.0
    Total                 125      59.0* 
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        7        29.2
     Fraud              17        70.8
    Total                 24       11.3* 
IVSA
PYCOGS
<=0 >0
<=0.282 >0.282
Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade
Moderate accuracy is achieved in the case of trading firms. It can be observed
that boosted trees show superior performance when detecting both fraud and non-
fraud cases. Decision trees, on the other hand, achieved exceptional results when
predicting fraud instances, but poor performance when dealing with non-fraud cases.
Furthermore, decision trees results suggest that fraudulent trading companies
manipulate mainly two financial items simultaneously, that is, retained earnings
and inventories. Two clear patterns can be identified when accounting fraud is
being committed, as shown in Figure 5.
The first pattern has been found when the RETA ratio is between 0 and 0.186,
and the IVSA ratio is higher than 0.189. That is, moderate positive values of retained
earnings and large values of inventory happening together represents a clear sign of
falsified reports.
The second pattern of fraudulent activity is identified when the RETA ratio is
higher than 0.186 and, at the same time, the IVSA ratio is higher than 0.335 That
is, exaggerated valuation of earnings compared to assets, and inventory compared
to sales are considered in this industry as irregular, hence more attention should be
paid when facing this situation.
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Figure 5: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      169       50.0
     Fraud              169       50.0
    Total                 338     100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       63      44.3
     Fraud               75      55.7
    Total                 138     40.8* 
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       64      63.4
     Fraud               37      36.6
    Total                 101     29.9* 
RETA
<=0 >0.186
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       33      54.1
     Fraud               28      45.9
    Total                  61      18.1*
Node 5
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        9         23.7
     Fraud               29        76.3
    Total                  38       11.2* 
IVSA
<=0.189 >0.189
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       42       42.4
     Fraud               57       57.6
    Total                  99      29.3* 
(0, 0.186]
Node 6
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       61      70.1
     Fraud               26      29.9
    Total                  87      25.7* 
Node 7
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        3        21.4
     Fraud               11       78.6
    Total                  14        4.1* 
IVSA
<=0.335 >0.335
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Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Moderate prediction accuracy is obtained again, now in the industry of
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate. In general, more advanced models achieved
slightly better performance, out of which boosting techniques perform the best. In
particular, it can be seen that boosted trees correctly classify 68.2% of non-fraud
cases and 63.2% of fraud cases.
Moreover, and as it can be seen in Figure 6, fraudulent reporting within financial
firms is more likely to be occurring as a result of manipulation of accounts payable
and debt-specific figures. On the one hand, if accounts payable are lower or equal
to zero together with long-term debt higher than zero, then more attention must be
paid as it may be a sign of accounting fraud.
On the other hand, if accounts payable to cost of good sold are higher than
22.82 and, simultaneously, total liabilities are 19.05 times more than shareholders’
equity, then warning alarm should be activated as irregular patterns are occurring
that suggest fraudulent activities.
Services
Poor performance achieved by machine learning methods when detecting
accounting fraud within the service industry. Relatively better performance
attained by tree-based methods, being decision trees the methodology that showed
a more balanced performance regarding correct positive and negative
classifications, that is, between sensitivity and specificity.
In addition, and as depicted in Figure 7, a fairly straightforward trick is usually
performed by fraudulent companies in the industry of service, that is understating
of sales figure together with the artificial exaggeration of inventory. More scrutiny
should be made when total sales represent less than 25.6% of total assets, as well as
when the proportion of inventory in terms of cost of good sold is higher than 0.032,
as they may be indicating that accounting fraud is being conducted.
Public Administration
Exceptional results are obtained in the industry of public administration.
Particularly superior performance was accomplished by random forests, as 90% of
non-fraudulent cases are correctly classified, as well as 83.8% of fraudulent cases.
Accounting fraud in the industry of public administration is highly related to
large values of inventory compared to sales, as it can be seen in Figure 8.
Furthermore, special attention should be paid when evidencing inventories
representing 6.3% or more of total sales, as this is a clear sign of manipulated
financial reports.
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Figure 6: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       236     50.0
     Fraud               236     50.0
    Total                 472    100.0*
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       150     47.0
     Fraud               169     53.0
    Total                  319     67.6* 
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       64      68.1
     Fraud               30      31.9
    Total                  94      19.9* 
PYCOGS
(0, 22.815] >22.815
Node 4
   Category              n         %
     Non-Fraud        11      91.7
     Fraud                 1         8.3
    Total                   12       2.5*
Node 5
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       11       23.4
     Fraud               36       76.7
    Total                  47       10.0* 
LTDTA
<=0 >0
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       22      37.3
     Fraud               37      62.7
    Total                  59     12.5* 
<=0
Node 6
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       64      72.7
     Fraud               24      27.3
    Total                  88      18.6* 
Node 7
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        0         0.0
     Fraud                6     100.0
    Total                   6         1.3* 
TLTE
<=19.05 >19.05
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Figure 7: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Services
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud      375       50.0
     Fraud              375       50.0
    Total                 750     100.0*
Node 2
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       213     40.7
     Fraud               311     59.3
    Total                  524     69.9*
Node 3
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       110     72.9
     Fraud                 41     27.1
    Total                  151     20.1* 
SATA
(0.256, 1.364] >1.364
Node 4
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       48      81.4
     Fraud               11      18.6
    Total                  59       7.9*
Node 5
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud         4       25.0
     Fraud               12       75.0
    Total                  16        2.1* 
IVCOGS
<=0.032 >0.032
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       52      69.3
     Fraud               23      30.7
    Total                 75       10.0*
<=0.256
Figure 8: Decision Tree Visualisation
Industry: Public Administration
Node 0
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud        36      50.0
     Fraud                36      50.0
    Total                   72    100.0* 
Node 1
   Category             n         %
     Non-Fraud       25      86.2
     Fraud                 4      13.8
    Total                 29       40.3*
Node 2
   Category             n        %
     Non-Fraud       11      25.6
     Fraud               33      74.4
    Total                  43      59.7* 
IVSA
<=0.063 >0.063
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5. Conclusions
5.1. Conclusions
This study aims to identify signs of accounting fraud occurrence to be used to,
first, identify companies that are more likely to be manipulating financial
statement reports, and second, assist the task of examination within the riskier
firms by evaluating relevant financial red-flags, as to efficiently recognise irregular
accounting malpractices.
To achieve this, a thorough forensic data analytic approach is proposed that
includes all pertinent steps of a data-driven methodology. First, data collection and
preparation is required to present pertinent information related to fraud offences
and financial statements. Then, an in-depth financial ratio analysis is performed
in order to analyse the collected data and to preserve only meaningful variables.
Finally, statistical modelling of fraudulent and non-fraudulent instances is performed
by implementing several machine learning methods, followed by the extraction of
distinctive fraud-risk indicators related to each economic sector.
This study contributes in the improvement of accounting fraud detection in
several ways, including the collection of a comprehensive sample of fraud and
non-fraud firms concerning all financial industries, an extensive analysis of
financial information and significant differences between genuine and fraudulent
reporting, selection of relevant predictors of accounting fraud, contingent
analytical modelling for better differentiate between non-fraud and fraud cases,
and identification of industry-specific indicators of falsified records.
The results of the current research suggest there is a great potential in
detecting falsified accounting records through statistical modelling and analysis of
publicly available accounting information. It has been shown good performance of
basic models used as benchmark - discriminant analysis and logistic regression-,
and better performance of more advanced methods, including AdaBoost, decision
trees, boosted trees and random forests. Results support the usefulness of machine
learning models as they appropriately meet the criteria of accuracy,
interpretability and cost-efficiency required for a successful detection system.
The proposed methodology can be easily used by public auditors and
regulatory agencies in order to assess the likelihood of accounting fraud, and also
to be adopted in combination with the experience and knowledge of experts to
lead to better examination of accounting reports. In addition, the proposed
methodological framework could be of assistance to many other interested parties,
including investors, creditors, financial and economic analysts, amongst others.
5.2. Limitations and Future Work
The collected sample of accounting fraud offences is considered to be only a
fragment of the population of companies issuing fraudulent financial statement, as
there is no guarantee that non-fraudulent firms are in fact legitimate observations
until proven otherwise. Also, non-public companies are excluded from this study as
the SEC only has jurisdiction over publicly traded companies.
It is worth noting that accounting fraud is very versatile, and as such, will
always evolve in terms of deceptive tricks. Managers will adapt their fraudulent
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schemes in order to successfully commit fraud, hence results obtained in this study
are exclusively consequence of the investigation of the collected data and different
conclusions may be reach when considering an alternative source of information.
Lastly, models performances are not ideal in some scenarios mainly due to
sample size and omitted predictive variables. It is strongly suggested the inclusion
of additional information to help better understand the accounting fraud
phenomenon, which may consist of qualitative variables, including corporate
governance information and inside trading data, as well as time-evolving features
and industry-trending benchmarks. It would not be surprising to discover
interesting temporal patterns of stock prices or asset returns when dealing with
fraudulent corporations, or find an extraordinary economic performance of
dishonest companies compared to the industry average.
Further work can be done for classification threshold selection. When modelling
the accounting fraud phenomenon, it was mentioned that a specific classification
threshold was considered to determine fraud and non-fraud categories in several
machine learning techniques. Evaluation of different thresholds would be of much
interest as it may improve classification accuracy in a cost-sensitive environment,
such as the one at issue.
In addition, different methodologies are suggested to tackle the imbalance class
challenge. The method adopted in the present study was based on random
under-sampling, but other techniques may improve this part of the process, such as
random over-sampling, bootstrap models, cost modifying methods and
algorithm-level approaches, to name a few.
More advanced machine learning techniques are also recommended. It would
be very interesting to implement alternative and more advanced methods, such as
support vector machines, neural networks and Bayesian models, as they may be
helpful to correctly identify fraudulent firms.
Finally, it is suggested to replicate the proposed methodology in specific economic
domains, such as the pharmaceutical industry, health care industry and financial
industry, amongst others. The more specialised the industry, the more interesting
patterns are likely to be found and, therefore, to be explored and analysed.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,
Stanford Law School, for providing access to the collection of fraud cases
considered in this study.
37
References
References
S. Abe. Support Vector Machines for Pattern Classification. Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 2005.
B. Baesens, V. V. Vlasselaer, and W. Verbeke. Fraud Analytics Using Descriptive, Predictive, and
Social Network Techniques: A Guide to Data Science for Fraud Detection. John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 2015.
M. Beasley. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition
and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, 1996.
T. Bell and J. Carcello. A Decision Aid for Assessing the Likelihood of Fraudulent Financial
Reporting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 2000.
C. M. Bishop. Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning. Springer, 2006.
R. Bolton and D. Hand. Statistical Fraud Detection: A Review. Statistical Science, 2002.
M. Cerullo and V. Cerullo. Using Neural Networks to Predict Financial Reporting Fraud. Computer
Fraud and Security, 1999.
N. V. Chawla, N. Japkowicz, and A. Kotcz. Editorial: Special Issue on Learning from Imbalanced
Data Sets. ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter, 2004.
J. Choi and B. Green. Assessing the Risk of Management Fraud Through Neural Network
Technology. Auditing, 1997.
K. Fanning and K. Cogger. Neural Network Detection of Management Fraud Using Published
Financial Data. International Journal of Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance &
Management, 1998.
E. H. Feroz, T. M. Kwon, V. Pastena, and K. Park. The Efficacy of Red Flags in Predicting the
SEC’s Targets: An Artificial Neural Networks Approach. International Journal of Intelligent
Systems in Accounting, Finance & Management, 2000.
R. Gupta and N. S. Gill. Prevention and Detection of Financial Statement Fraud - An
Implementation of Data Mining Framework. International Journal of Advanced Computer
Science and Applications, 2012.
J. V. Hansen, J. B. McDonald, J. W. F. Messier, and T. B. Bell. A Generalized Quanlitative-
Response Model and the Analysis of Management Fraud. Management Science, 1996.
M. Hollander, D. A. Wolfe, and E. Chicken. Nonparametric Statistical Methods: Third Edition.
Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics. Wiley, 2013.
B. Hoogs, T. Kiehl, C. Lacomb, and D. Senturk. A Genetic Algorithm Approach to Detecting
Temporal Patterns Indicative of Financial Statement Fraud. Intelligent Systems in Accounting,
Finance and Management, 2007.
G. James, D. Witten, T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani. An Introduction to Statistical Learning.
Springer-Verlag New York, 2013.
K. A. Kaminski, T. S. Wetzel, and L. Guan. Can Financial Ratios Detect Fraudulent Financial
Reporting? Managerial Auditing Journal, 2004.
M. G. Kendall. Rank Correlation Methods. Hafner Publishing Co, 1955.
E. Kirkos, C. Spathis, and Y. Manolopoulos. Data Mining Techniques for the Detection of
Fraudulent Financial Statements. Expert Systems with Applications, 2007.
S. Kotsiantis, E. Koumanakos, D. Tzelepis, and V. Tampakas. Forecasting Fraudulent Financial
Statements Using Data Mining. International Journal of Computational Intelligence, 2006.
T. M. Kwon and E. Feroz. A Multilayered Perceptron Approach to Prediction of the SEC’s
Investigation Targets. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 1996.
R. Mokhiber and R. Weissman. On The Rampage: Corporate Power and the Destruction of
Democracy. Corporate Focus Series. Common Courage Press, 2005.
E. W. Ngai, Y. Hu, Y. Wong, Y. Chen, and X. Sun. The Application of Data Mining Techniques in
Financial Fraud Detection: A Classification Framework and an Academic Review of Literature.
Decision Support Systems, 2011.
P. F. Pai, M. F. Hsu, and M. C. Wang. A Support Vector Machine-Based Model for Detecting
Top Management Fraud. Knowledge-Based Systems, 2011.
38
F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel, M. Blondel,
P. Prettenhofer, R. Weiss, V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Passos, D. Cournapeau, M. Brucher,
M. Perrot, and E. Duchesnay. Scikit-learn: Machine Learning in Python. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 2011.
O. S. Persons. Using Financial Statement Data to Identify Factors Associated with Fraudulent
Financial Reporting. Journal of Applied Business Research, 1995.
P. Ravisankar, V. Ravi, G. R. Rao, and I. Bose. Detection of Financial Statement Fraud and
Feature Selection Using Data Mining Techniques. Decision Support Systems, 2011.
H. M. Schilit and J. Perler. Financial Shenanigans. Mc Graw Hill, 2010.
D. J. Sheskin. Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures: Third Edition.
CRC Press, 2003.
X. P. Song, Z. H. Hu, J. G. Du, and Z. H. Sheng. Application of Machine Learning Methods to
Risk Assessment of Financial Statement Fraud: Evidence from China. Journal of Forecasting,
2014.
C. Spathis, M. Doumpos, and C. Zopounidis. Detecting Falsified Financial Statements: A
Comparative Study Using Multicriteria Analysis and Multivariate Statistical Techniques. The
European Accounting Review, 2002.
S. Summers and J. Sweeney. Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements and Insider Trading:
An Empirical Analysis. The Accounting Review, 1998.
M. Swartz. Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron. Doubleday, 2003.
J. Tu. Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Artificial Neural Networks Versus Logistic
Regression for Predicting Medical Outcomes. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 1996.
V. Van Vlasselaer, T. Eliassi-Rad, L. Akoglu, M. Snoeck, and B. Baesens. GOTCHA! Network-
based Fraud Detection for Social Security Fraud. Management Science, 2015.
Maria Jofre is a Casual Lecturer at the Discipline of Business Analytics, The
University of Sydney Business School. She holds a B. Eng and a MS from the
University of Chile, and a Ph.D. from the University of Sydney. Her areas of expertise
and interest are statistical machine learning and corporate criminology.
Richard Gerlach’s research interests lie mainly in financial econometrics and time series.
His work has concerned developing time series models for measuring, forecasting and
managing risk in financial markets as well as computationally intensive Bayesian methods
for inference, diagnosis, forecasting and model comparison. Recent focus has been
Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall forecasting. He has developed structural break and
intervention detection tools for use in state space models; also has an interest in
estimating logit models incorporating misclassification and variable selection. His applied
work has involved forecasting risk levels during and after the Global Financial Crisis;
assessing asymmetry in major international stock markets, in response to local and
exogenous factors; stock selection for financial investment using logit models; and option
pricing and hedging involving barriers.
His research papers have been published in Journal of the American Statistical Association,
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Journal
of Time Series Analysis and the International Journal of Forecasting. He has been an
invited speaker and regular presenter at international conferences such as the International
conference for Computational and Financial Econometrics, the International Symposium on
Forecasting and the International
39
